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Warren Burnett* and Larry Zinn**
I. DEFENSES
A. Affirmative Defenses-Standard of Appellate Review
QUESTION plaguing appellate courts recently is what evidentiary
standard of review applies to cases involving affirmative defenses.1
Three separate courts of appeals had previously held that the appli-
cable standard of review was whether the jury's implied finding was so
against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be mani-
festly unjust. 2 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted petitions in all
three cases and reversed the lower courts' decisions.3 In the leading case,
Van Guilder v. State,4 the court rejected the standard of great weight and
preponderance of the evidence in criminal cases, both in a general review of
the evidence and more specifically in a review of the evidence for affirmative
defenses.5 The court stated that allowing the use of a great weight and pre-
ponderance standard "would make the courts of appeal a thirteenth juror
with veto power."' 6 Instead, the court held that appellate courts were bound
by the standard set by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v.
Virginia.7
In Jackson the Supreme Court held that in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence appellate courts must determine whether, after viewing the evi-
* J.D., Baylor University. Attorney at Law, Galveston and Odessa, Texas.
** B.A., J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, San Antonio, Texas.
1. In an affirmative defense, the defendant has the burden to prove the defense by a
preponderance of the evidence. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.04(d) (Vernon 1974). This bur-
den differs from that in other defenses under the Penal Code. In other defenses, the burden of
producing evidence lies with the defendant. Id. § 2.03(c). If, however, the defendant meets
the burden of production, then the state must disprove the allegation beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. § 2.03(d). Some examples of affirmative defenses under the Penal Code include
mistakes of law, § 8.03, duress, § 8.05, and insanity, § 8.01.
2. Bakker v. State, 682 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, pet.
granted); Van Guilder v. State, 674 S.W.2d 915, 919-20 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, pet.
granted); Schuessler v. State, 647 S.W.2d 742, 748-49 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, pet. granted).
3. Schuessler v. State, 719 S.W.2d 320, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Baker v. State, 707
S.W.2d 893, 894-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Van Guilder v. State, 709 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2891, 90 L. Ed. 2d 978 (1986).
4. 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2891, 90 L. Ed. 2d
978 (1986).
5. Id. at 180.
6. Id.
7. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
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dence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.8 Apply-
ing this test to affirmative defenses, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
held that the identical standard applied.9 The appellate courts must first
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the implicit finding by the
jury with respect to the affirmative defense and next determine whether a
rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove his
defense by a preponderance of the evidence, by examining all evidence con-
cerning the affirmative defense.' 0
B. Insanity-Application of Van Guilder Standard
Now that the standard of review has changed, the question remains
whether the results will change. For most cases, the answer is probably not.
Compare, for example, Jones v. State" and Moss v. State. 12 Jones was de-
cided before Van Guilder; therefore, the court of appeals applies the great
weight and preponderance standard.' 3 Moss, however, was decided after
Van Guilder, and the court applied the rational trier of fact standard.
14
Both cases involved the affirmative defense of insanity and had similar facts.
In each, experts testified that the defendant was insane, and lay witnesses
testified that the defendant appeared rational. Applying the different stan-
dards of review, the courts reached the same result. Each held that a conflict
existed in the evidence and that this conflict had to be resolved in favor of
the jury verdict of guilty.' 3
In a few cases, however, the different standards will lead to different re-
sults. The great weight and preponderance standard allows an appellate
court more latitude than does the Van Guilder standard. This means that,
under Van Guilder, defendants will find it harder to establish affirmative de-
fenses conclusively when the evidence is close. In State v. Schuessler 16 the
defendant relied on the affirmative defense of insanity. Evidence of insanity
included the opinions of three experts and the testimony of lay witnesses
about numerous bizarre acts by the defendant. Evidence of sanity included
the inconclusive opinion of one expert and some evidence of an attempt to
conceal the crime. The court of appeals held that the jury's verdict was
against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.17 As basis for
its decision, the court cited the "overwhelming evidentiary disparity."18 The
court of criminal appeals reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the ver-
8. Id. at 318-19.
9. 709 S.W.2d at 181.
10. Id.
11. 699 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, no pet.).
12. 704 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no pet.).
13. 699 S.W.2d at 582.
14. 704 S.W.2d at 940-41.
15. Moss, 704 S.W.2d at 941-48; Jones, 699 S.W.2d at 582.
16. 647 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. App.-El Paso), rev'd, 719 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).




dict.19 The court stated that if there is conflicting evidence on the issue of
insanity, the trier of fact is the sole judge as to weight and credibility of the
evidence. 20 Because there was conflicting testimony, the court of appeals
was without power to overturn the jury's verdict. 21 In these circumstances,
the only time that a court can interfere with the verdict is if the jury's verdict
is irrational. 22 To do otherwise, said the court, would allow an appellate
court to serve as a "thirteenth juror with veto power."'23
C. Defensive Theory-Right to Instruction
Defendants are entitled to an affirmative defensive instruction on every
defense raised by the evidence. 24 The question answered in Sanders v.
State2 5 is what constitutes a "defense." The court reviewed the defenses
found in the Penal Code and held that the defenses all sought to justify the
defendant's admitted participation in the act itself.26 The statutory defenses
require the defendant first to admit the commission of the crime.27 When a
defendant presents a defensive theory that merely negates an element of the
crime, he is denying participation and therefore is not presenting a defense
that triggers the right to an instruction.28 The teaching of Sanders, one of
questionable value to defendants, is that if the defendant presents a defense
that admits the crime, then he is assured an instruction, but if he presents a




Renunciation is an affirmative defense to the crime of attempt.30 Thomas
v. State3' involved the issue of whether this defense can be invoked after a
completed attempt. The defendant was convicted of attempted burglary. In
his confession he stated that he went to a side window of a house, took off
19. 719 S.W.2d at 330.
20. Id. at 329.
21. Id. at 330.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Booth v. State, 679 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Lugo v. State,
667 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
25. 707 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
26. Id. at 81.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 80-81.
29. Id.
30. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.04(a) (Vernon 1974) states:
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under Section 15.01 of this code [for
criminal attempt] that under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and com-
plete renunciation of his criminal objective the actor avoided commission of the
offense attempted by abandoning his criminal conduct or, if abandonment was
insufficient to avoid commission of the offense, by taking further affirmative ac-
tion that prevented the commission.
31. 708 S.W. 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
1987]
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some weather stripping, and then changed his mind and left. The court of
appeals determined that the renunciation defense was irrelevant in this case
because the crime of attempted burglary had already been completed at the
time the defendant renounced his acts.32 The court of criminal appeals dis-
agreed with the lower court's logic. Under the court of appeals' interpreta-
tion, the renunciation defense could only be invoked prior to the attempt,
but if the conduct had not reached the level of an attempt, then no crime had
been committed.33 This interpretation would render the renunciation de-
fense meaningless.3 4 Relying on the language of the renunciation statute, 35
the court of criminal appeals held that the renunciation defense could be
invoked after an attempt to commit an offense had been committed, but
before the object offense (e.g. burglary) had been committed. 36 The renunci-
ation defense applied to the object offense, not the attempt.3 7 The defendant
was therefore entitled to invoke the defense.3 8
B. Solicitation-Lesser Included Offense
In Chanslor v. State 39 the court held that aiding a suicide4° was a lesser
included defense of solicitation to commit murder.41 A lesser included of-
fense is an offense that differs from a second offense, which a defendant is
charged with, only in that its commission is established by a less serious
injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest.42
The crime of aiding a suicide, a misdemeanor, is less of a threat to the public
interest in preserving life than murder solicitation,43 just as manslaughter
represents a less serious injury to the public interest than murder." As with
other homicides, the question is merely one of intent.45 The defendant in
Chanslor bought poison from an undercover officer. The issue before the
court was whether the defendant intended to use the poison to aid a suicide
32. Id. at 862.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.04(a) (Vernon 1974).
36. 708 S.W.2d at 863.
37. Id.
38. After holding that the facts presented a jury issue on the renunciation defense, the
court held that the defendant failed to establish the defense as a matter of law and affirmed the
conviction. Id. at 863-64.
39. 697 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
40. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08(a) (Vernon 1974) states: "A person commits an
offense if, with intent to promote or assist the commission of suicide by another, he aids or
attempts to aid the other to commit or attempt to commit suicide."
41. Id. § 15.03(a) states:
A person commits an offense if, with intent that a capital felony or felony of the
first degree be committed, he requests, commands, or attempts to induce an-
other to engage in specific conduct that, under the circumstances surrounding
his conduct as the actor believes them to be, would constitute the felony or make
the other a party to its commission.
42. 697 S.W.2d at 396; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09(2) (Vernon 1981).
43. 697 S.W.2d at 397.
44. Id. at 396-97.
45. Id. at 397.
[Vol. 41
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or to commit murder.46 The court concluded that whatever the intent, it
was a question for the jury.47
III. CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON
A. Homicide
1. Murder-Evidence of Criminally Negligent Homicide
The use of criminally negligent homicide as a defense to murder has al-
ways posed an almost insurmountable task for the defendant. 48 In Thomas
v. State,49 Mendieta v. State,50 and Still v. State,5 the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals made criminally negligent homicide even harder to assert as a
defense. In Thomas, the leading case, the defendant claimed that he pointed
a loaded gun at the deceased, there was a struggle, and the gun inadvertently
fired.52 The defendant testified that he did not intend to kill the victim, but
that it was simply an accident. 53 The court held that this evidence was in-
sufficient to raise the issue of criminally negligent homicide. 54 The essence
of criminally negligent homicide is the failure on the part of the defendant to
perceive the risk created by his conduct. 55 Evidence that a defendant
pointed a loaded gun or lacked the intent to kill, or that the weapon acciden-
tally discharged was, by itself, insufficient to raise the issue, and the court
questioned its past holdings that suggested otherwise. 56 Because the defend-
ant knew that pointing a loaded gun at the deceased could cause injury to
the deceased, he was aware of the risk of his conduct and therefore was not
entitled to an instruction on criminally negligent homicide. 57
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of murder. Thomas v. State,
699 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Criminally negligent homicide is defined in
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.07(a) (Vernon 1974) as follows: "A person commits an offense
if he causes the death of an individual by criminal negligence." This offense is a Class A
misdemeanor. Id. § 19.07(b). Criminal negligence is defined in id. § 6.03(d):
A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with respect
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that
the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor's standpoint.
49. 699 S.W.2d 845, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
50. 706 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
51. 709 S.W.2d 658, 660-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
52. 699 S.W.2d at 849.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 852.
55. Id. at 849; see also Lewis v. State, 529 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
56. 699 S.W.2d at 849-50. The court specifically questioned Schoelman v. State, 644
S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Giles v. State, 617 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981);
London v. State, 547 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); and Dockery v. State, 542 S.W.2d
644 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
57. 699 S.W.2d at 852. The court of criminal appeals reached the same result in Mendieta
v. State, 706 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), and Still v. State, 709 S.W.2d 658 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986). In Mendieta the defense presented evidence showing that the defendant
swung a knife in front of him to keep the deceased away. 706 S.W.2d at 651. In Still the
1987]
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2. Cobarrubio Error-Egregious Harm
In the past Survey year, Cobarrubio v. State18 met Almanza v. State . 9
The issue was whether (1) Cobarrubio error was fundamental and (2) if so,
under what circumstances was the error egregious harm. In Lawrence v.
State 60 the court of criminal appeals quickly held that Cobarrubio error was
fundamental error but then concluded that, under the circumstances, the
defendant did not suffer egregious harm.6' Although there was sufficient
evidence to submit sudden passion, the defendant relied only incidentally on
this defense;62 therefore, the court held that no egregious harm existed. 63
In Castillo-Fuentes v. State64 the court found egregious harm.65 The dif-
ference between this case and Lawrence was that here the defendant's only
defense was sudden passion. 66 Under these circumstances, actual and egre-
gious harm existed. 67
3. Murder-Holocaust Syndrome
In Werner v. State68 the court of criminal appeals examined the scope of
Texas Penal Code section 19.0669 and the admissibility of psychological "pe-
culiarities" through the dark context of the Holocaust syndrome.70 At his
defense presented evidence that the defendant knew how to handle guns, pointed a cocked gun
at the deceased, realized that the gun could go off, and attempted to uncock it when it dis-
charged. 709 S.W.2d at 660-61. Relying on Thomas, the court in both cases held that the
evidence showed that the defendants perceived the risk created by their conduct and that the
evidence therefore failed to raise the issue of criminally negligent homicide. Mandieta, 706
S.W.2d at 653; Still, 709 S.W.2d at 661.
58. 675 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). In Cobarrubio the court held that the state
must bear the burden of proving the lack of sudden passion, and that "this burden must be so
placed in the paragraph of the charge applying the law of murder to the facts of the case." Id.
at 751.
59. 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Almanza did away with the automatic rever-
sal rule for fundamental error. Id. at 174. Now the standard for reversal for unobjected to
fundamental error is egregious harm. Id. at 171.
60. 700 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
61. Id. at 212-13.
62. Id. at 211-13.
63. Id. Three courts of appeals have followed Lawrence and held that when the record
supports that the defendant only incidentally relied on a sudden passion defense, then there
can be no finding of egregious harm. Shoaf v. State, 706 S.W. 170, 172 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1986, no pet.); Waldo v. State, 705 S.W.2d 381, 385-86 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986,
no pet.); White v. State, 699 S.W.2d 607, 617-18 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no pet.).
64. 707 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
65. Id. at 563.
60. Id. at 562.
67. Id. at 562-63.
68. 711 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
69. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06 (Vernon 1974) states:
In all prosecutions for murder or voluntary manslaughter, the state or the de-
fendant shall be permitted to offer testimony as to all relevant facts and circum-
stances surrounding the killing and the previous relationship existing between
the accused and the deceased, together with all relevant facts and circumstances
going to show the condition of the mind of the accused at the time of the offense.
70. The Holocaust syndrome is a psychological condition that afflicts survivors and chil-
dren of survivors of Nazi concentration camps. The syndrome often manifests itself in the
person overreacting to situations in which he perceives his safety threatened. The reason is
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murder trial, the defendant sought to introduce evidence of his Holocaust
syndrome to show that he was acting in self-defense. 71 Both the trial court
and the court of appeals excluded the evidence;72 the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals agreed. 73 First, the court looked to section 19.06 of the Penal
Code and held that the statute went no further than the general rules of
evidence. 74 Second, the court stated that the issue of self-defense was mea-
sured by what an ordinary and prudent man would have done under the
same or similar circumstances. 75 The court concluded that the excluded evi-
dence merely showed that the defendant was not an ordinary and prudent
man because he suffered from a "psychological peculiarity," i.e. the Holo-
caust syndrome.76 The evidence was therefore irrelevant. 77
B. Sexual Assault
1. Promiscuity-Consent Must Be in Issue
It is a defense to sexual assault of a child that the child was fourteen years
or older and had, prior to the time of the offense, engaged promiscuously in
sexual conduct. 78 Two courts of appeals have held, however, that it is only a
defense when consent is in issue. 79 The courts followed case law interpreting
the old statutory rape statute and the promiscuity defense under the 1925
Penal Code.80 Because the old law was the same as the new law, the courts
held that neither evidence nor a charge on promiscuity was proper in the
absence of a consent issue.81
2. Promiscuity--Sufficient Evidence
Two additional courts of appeals dealt with the issue of what is sufficient
evidence to establish the defense of promiscuity. In Wicker v. State82 the
court held that if the complainant had only engaged in intercourse with one
other person on one occasion the evidence failed to establish promiscuity as
that he comes from a background in which, he believes, people did not do enough to protect
themselves. 711 S.W.2d at 642.
71. Id. at 640-43.
72. Id. at 640.
73. Id. at 646.
74. Id. at 644. Section 19.06 states that any party can offer testimony on all relevant facts
surrounding the killing. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06 (Vernon 1974); see supra note 69.
75. 711 S.W.2d at 645.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 l(d)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1987) (formerly id. § 2109(b)
(Vernon 1974)).
79. Lewis v. State, 709 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, pet. ref'd, un-
timely filed); Moore v. State, 703 S.W.2d 762, 764 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no
pet.).
80. Tex. Penal Code Ann. art. 1183 (Vernon 1925). The Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals came to the same conclusion. Wright v. State, 527 S.W.2d 859, 862-63 (Tex. Crim. App.
1975); Esquivel v. State, 506 S.W.2d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
81. Lewis v. State, 709 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, pet. ref'd, un-
timely filed); Moore v. State, 703 S.W.2d 764, 764 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no
pet.).
82. 696 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, pet. granted).
1987]
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a matter of law.83 Under a different set of facts, the opposite result was
reached in Ormand v. State.84 In Ormand the complainant had had sexual
intercourse with four men, including two in one day.85 The court held this
conduct to be promiscuous as a matter of law.86
3. Evidence of Previous Sexual Conduct
The court in Capps v. State87 addressed the admissibility of evidence of
previous sexual conduct of the complainant under the "rape shield law." 88
The defendant was charged with aggravated sexual assault; his defense was
consent. The defendant attempted to introduce evidence of prior sexual con-
duct by the complainant, including "sex parties" and extramarital affairs, to
show promiscuous conduct. 89 The trial court excluded the evidence and the
court of appeals agreed.90 The court of appeals stated that section 22.06591
had the following prerequisites for admissibility: (1) the evidence must be
material to a fact issue, and (2) the evidence's probative value must outweigh
its inflammatory or prejudicial impact.92 The court found that the material-
ity issue was satisfied, but held that the prejudicial impact outweighed the
probative value where the only similarity between the extraneous evidence
and the alleged offense was the act of sexual intercourse. 93 To hold other-
wise, the court said, would be to sanction "a rule of global admissibility." 94
C. Assaultive Crimes
1. Aggravated Assault-Special Peace Officer
Preston v. State 95 answered the question of when a specially commissioned
peace officer is acting within the scope of his duties. The defendant in Pres-
ton was charged with aggravated assault of a peace officer.96 The peace of-
83. Id. at 682-83. The court relied on Scott v. State, 668 S.W.2d 901-02 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1984, pet. ref'd), which defined promiscuity as a continuing course of conduct that
"connotes a variety of consensual sexual conduct with a variety of partners continuing over a
reasonable period of time."
84. 697 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no pet.).
85. Id. at 773.
86. Id. The court also relied on Scott v. State, 668 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1984, pet. ref'd); see supra note 83.
87. 696 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, pet. ref'd).
88. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.065(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986), repealed pursuant to TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 181 If, § 9(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987) (current version at TEX. R.
CRIM. EVID. 412).
89. 696 S.W.2d at 488.
90. Id. at 488-90.
91. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.065(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986), repealed pursuant to TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 181 If, § 9(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987) (current version at TEX. R.
CRIM. EVID. 412).
92. 696 S.W.2d at 488-90.
93. Id. at 490.
94. Id.
95. 700 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
96. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987) states: "A person commits
an offense if the person commits assault as defined in Section 22.01 of this code and the person
. . . causes bodily injury to a peace officer . . . while the peace officer . . . is lawfully dis-
charging an official duty .... "
[Vol. 41
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ficer was a Lamar University campus policeman. At the time of the assault
the officer was off the campus arresting two suspects for a burglary commit-
ted on the campus. The defendant was across the street taking pictures of
the arrest. The campus policeman tried to arrest the defendant for a traffic
offense, blocking traffic. The defendant responded by macing the policeman.
The question was whether, at the time of the assault, the campus policeman
was lawfully discharging an official duty as a commissioned campus police
officer of Lamar University. The court said no.97 The campus policeman
was a specially commissioned peace officer; therefore, his power was limited
to that given him by statute.98 In this case, the statute limited this power to
the jurisdiction of the university or otherwise in the performance of his duty
as a campus peace officer. 99 The court concluded that a campus policeman
is not acting within his official duties when he tries to make an arrest for
traffic offenses that occur outside the jurisdiction of the university. 00 In so
holding the court expressly overruled Christopher v. State,10 l which stated
that a specially commissioned peace officer has lawful authority to make
traffic arrests anywhere in Texas.102
2. Injury to a Child-Mens Rea
In the crime of injury to a child,103 does the requisite intent go to the act
that causes the result or only to the result itself? For example, when a per-
son places a child in scalding water, must the state only prove that the per-
son intentionally put the child is the water, or must it prove that the person
intended serious bodily injury?" °4 In Alvarado v. State 105 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals held the latter theory of mens rea applied in that the state
97. 700 S.W.2d at 229-30.
98. Id.
99. Id. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.203 (Vernon 1972).
100. 700 S.W.2d at 230. The court rejected the state's argument of hot pursuit. Id. at 229.
Under the "hot pursuit doctrine" if a peace officer begins pursuit of a suspect in his jurisdiction
he may then continue the pursuit into another jurisdiction. Minor v. State, 153 Tex. Crim.
242, 247, 219 S.W.2d 467, 470 (1949). The court held in Preston that the campus policeman
was not in hot pursuit of the burglary suspects since the suspects were already handcuffed and
in the police car and that he was not in hot pursuit of the defendant since the traffic offense was
committed off campus. 700 S.W.2d at 229.
101. 639 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
102. Id. at 937. Christopher was a search and seizure case. The importance of the Preston
holding is that specially commissioned peace officers can no longer use traffic arrests outside
their jurisdiction for probable cause to search.
103. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987) states:
A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with
criminal negligence, by act or omission, engages in conduct that causes to a
child who is 14 years of age or younger...
(1) serious bodily injury;
(2) serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment;
(3) disfigurement or deformity; or
(4) bodily injury.
104. The issue is crucial to the defense of mistake of fact. For example, the person may
claim that he did not know the water was scalding. If the state need only show an intentional
act, e.g. putting the child in water, then this defense would be useless.
105. 704 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
1987]
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must prove that the person intended the result. 10 6 The defendant in Alva-
rado put her child in a tub of scalding water. Her defense was that she did
not know that the water was scalding. The defense requested a series of
instructions that required the jury to find the requisite intent with regard to
the results, the serious bodily injury, as opposed to just the act itself, placing
the child in the scalding water. 10 7 The trial court denied the instructions
and allowed the state to argue that if the defendant intentionally or know-
ingly placed the child in the water, then the defendant was guilty. 10 8 The
court of criminal appeals reversed."°9 After reviewing the statute, legislative
history, the rest of the Penal Code, and public policy, the court concluded
that the injury to a child statute 10 focused on the result of the conduct as
opposed to the conduct itself; therefore, the requisite mens rea spoke to the
result.11 '
IV. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
A. Arson and Criminal Mischief
1. Arson-Intent Allegation
In Archer v. State" 2 a court considered whether an arson indictment is
fundamentally defective if it alleges that a person "intentionally" started a
fire as opposed to alleging that he started a fire "with intent to destroy or
damage."' 13 The San Antonio court of appeals held that the requisite intent
for arson is the "intent to destroy or damage" property." 4 "Intentionally"
starting a fire is not sufficiently equivalent." 5 An indictment alleging only
that the person intentionally started the fire fails to allege the crime of
arson.
116
2. Arson-Lesser Included Offense
In Prejean v. State1" 7 a court of appeals held that criminal mischie" 18 was
106. Id. at 39.
107. Id. at 37. The requested instructions were:
A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to a result of his con-
duct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result.
A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his
conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the
result.
Id. (emphasis in original).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 40.
110. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
111. In so holding, the court reaffirmed its reasoning in Beggs v. State, 597 S.W.2d 375
(Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
112. 714 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no pet.).
113. Id. at 118.
114. Id.; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
115. 714 S.W.2d at 118. The court quoted the trial court's comment that "everytime any-
one lights a power light inside the City of Junction they are violating the indictment." Id.
116. Id.
117. 704 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.).
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not a lesser included offense of arson. 119 Generally, criminal mischief re-
quires proof of the value of the property damaged or destroyed, while arson
does not. 120 This difference proved fatal to the defendant in Prejean because
the court found that this essential element of criminal mischief, the amount
of loss, was not included within the proof necessary for arson. 12 1
3. Criminal Mischief-Unconstitutional Presumption
There is a presumption in the criminal mischief statute that if a utility
meter is tampered with, the person in whose name the utility services are
billed is presumed to have tampered with it.122 In Gersh v. State 123 the Dal-
las court of appeals held that this presumption was unconstitutional. 124 The
state presented evidence that someone had tampered with the gas meter at
the defendant's home. The state presented no evidence, however, that linked
the defendant to the tampering. Relying on the presumption, the trial court,
sitting as trier of fact, found the defendant guilty. 125 Although the court of
appeals found that the presumption had a rational premise, in that those
who tamper with meters have an economic incentive to do so, it concluded
that the presumption was unconstitutional as applied. 126 The problem with
the presumption was that it singled out people who were billed by utili-
ties. 127 The court noted that all sorts of living arrangements exist such as
landlord-tenant, roommates, and, as here, husband and wife; therefore,
many people other than the person billed could have an economic interest in
the utilities.128 The court concluded that the connection between proven
118. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987) states:
A person commits an offense if, without the effective consent of the owner:
(1) he intentionally or knowingly damages or destroys the tangible property of
the owner; or
(2) he intentionally or knowingly tampers with the tangible property of the
owner and causes pecuniary loss or substantial inconvenience to the owner or a
third person.
The severity of the offense ranges from a Class B misdemeanor to second degree felony and is
determined by the amount of the loss. See id. § 28.03(b).
119. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987)
120. See id. and id. § 28.03(2).
121. 704 S.W.2d at 122-23. The court relied on the rationale of Sanders v. State, 664
S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). The Court held in Sanders that a misdemeanor theft was
not a lesser included offense of theft from the person, a felony for which no pecuniary loss is
required, because misdemeanor theft contained the additional element of value. Id. at 709.
122. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.03(6) (Vernon Supp. 1987) states:
For the purposes of this section [criminal mischief], it shall be presumed that a
person in whose name public communications, public water, gas, or power sup-
ply is or was last billed and who is receiving the economic benefit of said com-
munication or supply, has knowingly tampered with the tangible property of the
owner. ...
Id. § 2.05 states that the trier of fact may find the presumed fact if the underlying facts are
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but the jury is not required to do so.
123. 714 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no pet.).
124. Id. at 82.
125. Id. at 80-81.





tampering and the person billed was arbitrary.129
B. Burglary
1. Burglary of Habitation-Lesser Included Offense
Criminal trespass 30 is a lesser included offense of burglary of a building
or habitation. T3 The question in Moreno v. State 132 was whether in a bur-
glary prosecution the evidence raised the right to an instruction on criminal
trespass. The defendant testified that he was sleeping in his camper across
the street from a trailer. He awoke in the night, heard dogs barking, saw the
trailer house door open, and went over "just to see what was going on." 133
At that point, the owner of the trailer appeared from a back bedroom, and a
fight ensued.' 34 The court held that this evidence raised a fact issue on
whether the defendant entered the trailer with the intent to commit a felony
or theft, the same element that distinguishes burglary from criminal tres-
pass. 135 If he did not have the requisite intent, his testimony established
only criminal trespass.136 The defendant was therefore entitled to an in-
struction on criminal trespass. 137
2. Burglary of Vehicle-Lesser Included Offense
Although criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of burglary of a
building or habitation, 138 in Cadieux v. State 139 a court of appeals held that
criminal trespass is not a lesser included offense of burglary of a vehicle. 140
The state presented evidence that a number of cars on a used car lot had
been burglarized and that the defendant was seen entering one of the cars.
The defendant testified that the car he entered was unlocked, that he opened
the door to unlock the hood, and that he had no intention of stealing any-
thing from that or any other car. The court concluded that this evidence did
not raise the issue of criminal trespass because criminal trespass was not a
lesser included offense of burglary of a vehicle. 141 Looking to the history of
129. Id. at 82.
130. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
131. Id. § 30.02. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held on three separate occa-
sions that tresspass is a lesser included offense of burglary. Aguilar v. State, 682 S.W.2d 556,
558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Daniels v. State, 633 S.W.2d 899, 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982);
Day v. State, 532 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
132. 702 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
133. Id. at 640.
134. The owner testified that he found the defendant in his trailer, that the defendant was
holding the owner's blanket, that other property was missing, and that the defendant
threatened to kill him.
135. 702 S.W.2d at 640.
136. Id.
137. Id. The court stated that the question was a "close one." Id. at 640 n.8. If the
defendant had claimed that he was breaking up a burglary in progress or that he was not guilty
of any offense, then he would not have been entitled to the criminal trespass instruction. Id.
138. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
139. 711 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, pet. ref'd).
140. Id. at 94; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.04 (Vernon 1974).
141. 711 S.W.2d at 94. The court also held that the defendant's objections at trial failed to
preserve the error. Id. Arguably then, the court's language on criminal trespass is dictum.
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the criminal trespass statute, the court concluded that criminal trespass only
proscribed unlawful intrusions onto real property. 142 Because the property
was personal property, in this case a vehicle, criminal trespass was not
relevant. 143
3. Burglary of Vehicle- "Riding the Rails"
With an espirit de corps to warm the soul of a Woody Guthrie, the El
Paso court of appeals held that "riding the rails," more commonly known as
hitching a ride on a freight train, did not constitute burglary of a vehicle. 144
Burglary of a vehicle involves entry with intent to commit a felony or, as
alleged here, theft. 145 Based on the element of intent, the court held that
there is no theft in hitching a ride on a freight train;1 46 therefore, the defend-
ant was not guilty of burglary for "riding the rails." 147
4. Burglary of Vehicle-Motorless Car
In Trevino v. State148 a court of appeals was confronted with the issue of
whether a person could be charged with burglary of a vehicle if the car had
no engine. The court could not find any Texas cases on point, but the court
did find one Missouri case.149 Relying on that case, the court said that the
lack of an engine (immobility) did not "change [the car's] character as a




In Sullivan v. State 152 the court of criminal appeals established some rules
on proving value in theft cases. 153 When a nonowner gives evidence of
value, he must be qualified to testify about value and he must explicitly state
142. Id. at 94-95.
143. Id. The court relied on Williams v. State, 605 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980), which held that criminal trespass was not a lesser included offense of unauthorized use
of a vehicle because criminal trespass involved only real property.
144. Ramirez v. State, 711 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, no pet.).
145. Id. at 408.
146. Id. The court noted that there might be theft involved in hitching on a passenger train
because that could be considered theft of service. Id. at 409.
147. Id. at 408-09. The court in dictum said hitching on a freight train might be criminal
trespass. Id. at 409. This conflicts with Cadieux v. State, which held that criminal trespass
only applied to real property. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
148. 697 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no pet.).
149. See State v. Ridinger, 364 Mo. 684, 691-92, 266 S.W.2d 626, 632 (1954) (immobile bus
still a "motor vehicle").
150. 697 S.W.2d at 478.
151. Id. at 478-79.
152. 701 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
153. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.08(a) (Vernon 1974):
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the fair market or replacement value of the property.154 When an owner
gives evidence of value, 155 he may give his opinion in "general and com-
monly understood terms."' 56 The owner need not say "market value" or
"replacement value." 57 The court will presume that the owner's value
opinion is in terms of fair market value.' 58 To rebut the owner's opinion
evidence, the defendant must offer controverting evidence because simply
impeaching the owner's credibility on cross-examination is insufficient.' 59
Applying these rules, the court held the owner's testimony that the property
was "worth $500 at least" sufficient to show a market value over $200.160
2. Theft-Deception Instruction
Deception is one of the means by which an owner is deprived of his effec-
tive consent.' 6 1 Deception is defined by statute.' 62  In MacDougall v.
State 163 the court held that, if deception is the only theory available to the
state under the evidence, the trial court must define deception in its charge
upon timely request.'64 The court rejected the notion that because deception
need not be defined in the indictment, 165 it need not be defined in the
charge. 166
Subject to the additional criteria of Subsections (b) and (c) of this section, value
under this chapter is:
(1) the fair market value of the property or service at the time and place of
the offense; or
(2) if the fair market value of the property cannot be ascertained, the cost of
replacing the property within a reasonable time after the theft.
154. 701 S.W.2d at 909.
155. The owner of property is competent to testify about the value of his property. Brown
v. State, 640 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Davila v. State, 547 S.W.2d 606, 610
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977).




160. Id. at 910.
161. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (Vernon Supp. 1987) states: "(a) A person commits
an offense if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property.
(b) Appropriation of property is unlawful if: (1) it is without the owner's effective consent
.... " Id. § 31.01(4) (Vernon 1974) states, " 'Effective consent' includes consent by a person
legally authorized to act for the owner. Consent is not effective if: (A) induced by deception
or coercion... "
162. Id. § 31.01(2) states, "'Deception' means: (A) creating or confirming by words or
conduct a false impression of law or fact that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the
transaction, and that the actor does not believe to be true ..
163. 702 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
164. Id. at 651-52. The evidence showed that the defendant was supposed to bring back
the boss's car by the next morning. Instead, the defendant and car were found in Arizona a
few months later.
165. The court cited Thomas v. State, 621 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) for this
proposition.
166. The court distinguished Thomas, 702 S.W.2d at 652.
We find the rule of Thomas has no bearing on the instant case. That a statutory
definition of an element need not be pled to give a defendant notice of what he is
charged with does not mean that a jury has no need of the definition in deter-




1. Hindering Secured Creditors-Refusal to Return Property
In an important consumer case, 167 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeasl
held that mere refusal to return property upon demand to a secured party is
not a crime under the hindering secured creditors statute. 168 The vehicle for
the decision was an information alleging that the defendant "concealed"
property from a secured creditor by "refusing to return" the property. 169
The court held that "concealing" involved more than the mere refusal to
return property on demand and that mere refusal to return did not generally
harm or reduce the value of property. 170 The court concluded that the infor-
mation did not allege a crime. 17 1
2. Securing Document by Deception-Special Statute
In Ogilvie v. State 172 the Dallas court of appeals held that a citizen cannot
be prosecuted under section 32.46 of the Penal Code, dealing with securing
execution of a document by deception, 173 for using a fictitious name on a
driver's license application. 174 In Texas, if a defendant's conduct is con-
demned under a general statute and a specific statute, then the specific stat-
ute controls.' 75 While defendant's conduct here violated section 32.46,176
his conduct also violated a more specific statute that specifically condemned
driver's license application fraud. 177 Applying the general-specific statute
167. Anzaldua v. State, 696 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
168. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.33(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987):
A person who has signed a security agreement creating a security interest in
property or a mortgage or deed of trust creating a lien on property commits an
offense if, with intent to hinder enforcement of that interest or lien, he destroys,
removes, conceals, encumbers, or otherwise harms or reduces the value of the
property.
169. 696 S.W.2d at 911.
170. Id. at 912.
171. Id. at 913.
172. 711 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, pet. ref'd).
173. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.46 (Vernon 1974) states: "A person commits an offense
if, with intent to defraud or harm any person, he, by deception, causes another to sign or
execute any document affecting property or service or the pecuniary interest of any per-
son. . . .An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree."
174. 711 S.W.2d at 367.
175. Id. at 366. The court cited the following cases as authority: Williams v. State, 641
S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Jones v. State, 552 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977); Sarratt v. State, 543 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); and Ex parte
Howell, 542 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
176. See supra note 173.
177. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687b, § 32(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, it is unlawful for any
person to commit any of the following acts:
(6) to use a false or fictitious name or give a false or fictitious address or use a
fictitious or counterfeit document in any application for a driver's license or a
certificate, or any renewal or duplicate thereof, or knowingly to make a false
statement or knowingly to conceal a material fact or otherwise commit a fraud
in any such application.
Id. § 44(a) provides: "It shall be a misdemeanor for any person to violate any of the provisions
19871
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rule, the court held that the specific statute controlled. 178 Since the specific
statute proscribed a misdemeanor, the court ordered the felony indictment
dismissed.' 79
V. OTHER CRIMES
A. Felony Gambling Promotion
Under Texas law, gambling, or making a bet, is a class C misdemeanor. 180
Promoting gambling, or receiving a bet, is a third degree felony. 18' In Adley
v. State ' 82 the court of criminal appeals explored what was actually meant
by "receiving a bet." The court could not find a clear definition; therefore,
the court struck down the statute as unconstitutionally vague.' 8 3 The court
looked to the legislative intent behind the felony gambling promotion stat-
ute, and found that the legislature was attempting to prohibit commercial
gambling and bookmaking, not social gambling such as friendly wagers.' 8 4
The court found that the legislature, by using the language "receives a bet,"
had "painted with too broad a brush."' 85 The statute inadvertently pun-
ished social gambling because in any betting situation, friendly or profes-
sional, at least two parties are always involved, the maker of the bet and the
receiver.' 86 The former received only a fine, for a class C misdemeanor,
while the latter drew prison time for a third degree felony.' 87 The court
of this Act unless such violation is by this Act or other laws of this State declared to be a
felony."
178. 711 S.W.2d at 367.
179. Id.
180. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 47.02 (Vernon Supp. 1987) states:
(a) A person commits an offense if he:
(1) makes a bet on the partial or final result of a game or contest or on the
performance of a participant in a game or contest;
(b) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that:
(1) the actor engaged in gambling in a private place;
(2) no person received any economic benefit other than personal winnings;
and
(3) except for the advantage of skill or luck, the risks of losing and the
chances of winning were the same for all participants.
(d) An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor.
181. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 47.03 (Vernon 1974) states: "(a) A person commits an
offense if he intentionally or knowingly does any of the following acts: . . . (2) receives,
records, or forwards a bet or offer to bet. . . . (b) An offense under this section is a felony of
the third degree."
182. 718 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
183. Id. at 685.
184. Id. at 684-85; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 47.03 comment (Vernon 1974).
185. 718 S.W.2d at 684-85.
186. Id.
187. Id. The example the court gave, and one that existed in the case, was as follows:
A and B attend a football game. B asks A to enter into an agreement regarding
the final result of the football game. B bets $25.00 that team X will win the
game. A accepts B's offer. Once accepted, A and B have made a bet. Clearly,
under the terms of section 47.02(a)(1) [Gambling], B and A are both makers of a
bet. Likewise, A has received B's offer to bet and, upon acceptance, has received
a bet under the terms of section 47.03(a)(2) [Felony Gambling Promotion]. B's
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concluded that section 47.03(a)(2), insofar as it prohibited receiving a bet,
was unconstitutionally vague. 188
B. Driving While Intoxicated
1. Intoxication-Not an Irrebutable Presumption
In 1983 the legislature revised the crime of driving while intoxicated.18 9 It
altered the definition of "intoxicated" by adding the clause "alcohol concen-
tration of 0.10 or more.'190 If a driver has this alcohol level in his blood he
is, by definition, "intoxicated." The question raised by this new definition
was whether the specified blood alcohol level created an unconstitutional
irrebuttable, or mandatory conclusive, presumption of intoxication. 191 In
Forte v. State 192 the court of criminal appeals held that, in redefining intoxi-
cation, the legislature did not create an irrebuttable presumption.1 93 The
legislature merely created a new definition. 194 There was no irrebuttable
presumption because the state still had to prove the element of intoxication
beyond a reasonable doubt.195 Although this element could now be proven
by a chemical test, a conviction did not necessarily follow from the offer of
the test.196 The jury would still have to find that (1) the test was trustworthy
and (2) the defendant had a 0.10 alcohol concentration at the time of the
crime, as opposed to at the time of the test. 197 In any case, by redefining the
crime, the legislature had acted within its boundaries in defining criminal
conduct as driving with alcohol concentrations of 0.10 or more. 198
conduct is only punishable as a misdemeanor. A, having additionally received
an offer to bet, is punishable as a felon.
Id. at 685.
188. Id.
189. Act of June 16, 1983, ch. 303, § 4, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 1568 (now TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 67011-1 (Vernon Supp. 1987)).
190. Id. art. 67011-1(a)(2) provides: "'Intoxicated' means: (A) not having the normal use
of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance,
a drug, or a combination of two or more of those substances into the body; or (B) having an
alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more." Before the 1983 amendments, evidence that the de-
fendant had an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more created only a rebuttable presumption of
intoxication. Id. art. 67011-5, § 3(a) (Vernon 1977) (now amended).
191. A mandatory conclusive presumption commands the jury to find an element of the
crime if the state proves the predicate facts giving rise to the presumption. Francis v. Franklin,
105 S. Ct. 1965, 1971, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344, 354-55 (1985).
192. 707 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
193. Id. at 94.
194. Id. at 94-95.
195. Id. at 95.
196. Id. at 94-95.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 95. Judge Clinton filed a cryptic concurring opinion. He stated that the "Court
leaves open for another day whether the statue is invalid for different reasons." Id. at 96. He
did not tell us what he had in mind.
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